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In this paper an ethical approach to educational methodology is discussed in
relation to the philosophies of Emanuel Levinas and Robert Cox. Cox’s anti-
essentialist understanding of historical materialism and Levinas’ metaphysical
idealism are applied to an analysis of the (self)-reflective methods required today
in Higher Education in the UK, such as Problem-Based Learning (PBL) and
Personal Development Planning (PDP). The paper identifies a post-Kantian
paradigm of the subject–object dichotomy as a cause of the ontological constraints
which pervade critical pedagogy, and instead it proposes a pre-ontological ethics
of the relationship with the other which questions self-centred strategies of
reflection.
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Introduction
Due to its being rooted in positivism and post-Enlightenment humanism, higher educa-
tion represents a modernist type of schooling which has long relied upon empirical
pragmatism and the Cartesian tradition of knowledge (Burbules 1990, 2007). In this
paper I will explore and analyse some tensions between these philosophical traditions
and contemporary challenges brought by new pedagogies based on the philosophical
concept of critical reflection. In what follows, I will argue that the post-Cartesian logic
of reason still underpins the politics of schooling. Although postmodern education
seeks to combat the old tradition and open pedagogy to disorder and difference, the
universalist ethos of progress, causality and predictability stemming from the Enlight-
enment is still in force. When we think about contemporary academia as a political
body, despite its varied embodiments under different Western democracies, we can
observe that it is strongly involved in the politics of equality and sameness. In today’s
post-colonial era of liberating the conquered subjects from master narratives, the same
overarching project of rationalising the advantages of criticism and self-criticism for
the common good of society and its democratic ideals is still in circulation. In this
project, critical reflection aims at perpetuation of the permitted ideologies, but very
rarely at questioning them. Despite the efforts from individual educators who try to
reject this politics in their everyday practice, the overarching educational ideology is
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still dependent on the Cartesian legacy of rationality, progress and history. The ties by
which contemporary academia is bound under ideological systems have been analysed
in many places (Giroux 1983, 1988, 1994; Giroux and McLaren 1989; Cherryholmes
1988; Barnett 1994; Jarvis 1992; Laurillard 1993; Szkudlarek 1993; Lyotard 1984;
Bloom 1987; Bauman 1988, 1993; Phillips 1995; Readings 1996; Rorty 1982, 1989;
Bourdieu [1984] 1996; Freire 1973; Gadamer 1992). Here I am interested in the
problematics of ethics and history which mould the ontological ground for reflection
in teaching and learning. In particular I will discuss the ethical predicament of ontology
according to Emmanuel Levinas ([1961] 1969, 1991, [1998] 2006) whose concept of
ethics will highlight the political and social obligation of academia. The historical
conjunction will be analysed from the perspective of Robert Cox (1994, 1997) who
investigates political systems as ethically bounded structures developing under certain
spatial and temporal circumstances (Cox and Jacobson 1973; Cox and Sinclair 1999).
I intend to focus on the polarised subject–object ontology which derives from the
Greek tradition and still underpins the pedagogy of reflection and (self)-reflection in
certain areas of educational methodology. Regarded as a mode of being by philosophy,
reflection in education has become a methodological tool which, I argue, reinstates
the same post-Kantian model of thinking that refutes freedom of criticism beyond the
ideology which defines what criticism is or should be. I pose a question about the
engagement of critical (self)-reflection with politics and how this relates to ethics.
Following Zygmunt Bauman’s (1993, 71) predicament that a description of any
discipline lies in a mapping of its boundaries, I want to observe how the act of mapping,
which itself is an intellectual commitment, presupposes the terrain of pedagogy under-
stood as the politics of educational methods. What I hope to achieve is a critique of
(self)-reflection which would transcend the traditional positivist approach to education
based on the fixed identity of the unified subject. I will then employ a philosophical
voice to comment on the current use of philosophy as a method in pedagogy, namely
critical thinking, particularly within the method of Problem-Based Learning (PBL) and
Personal Development Planning (PDP) which are premised on (self)-reflection
(Dewey 1933; Freire 1973; Boud, Keogh, and Walker 1985; Pollard 2002; Fook and
Gardner 2007).
The ‘Self’ in self-reflection
In the context of academic pedagogy the question of who or what is the ‘other’ in
the process of critical (self)-reflection seems politically and morally crucial. Under
the present ontological paradigm, the ‘other’ of (self)-reflection mirrors the self, and
consequently reproduces the ideology which introduced the need for, and politics of,
(self)-reflection as a ‘method’ in academia. If it is to sustain its ethical value, the
question about the other needs to be separated from philosophy of education. Within
the boundaries of the education system (self)-reflection is only a tool of systemic
reproduction, while the ‘self’, on which one reflects, becomes but metonymy of the
educational system as a whole. If critical (self)-awareness is to be taught as a
method of knowing (and being), the political meaning and the materialist-historicist
context of this method has to be analysed. ‘Transgressive materialism’ from Cox
and Levinas can serve to direct this analysis. Yet, as Levinas and Cox show, it is
not acceptable to discuss this problem from the perspective of one knowing subject,
such as the historicist’s, or the critic’s, the teacher’s, or the student’s. To (self)-
reflect would mean, first of all, to see the question as posed in certain historical and
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materialist circumstances, by particular stakeholders. Levinasian philosophy invites
one to transgress the boundaries of the question and the discipline from which it
emerges.1 Arguing the limits, however, does not satisfy ‘transgression’, in the
Levinasian terms, until it changes (self)-reflective thinking into action. By reflecting
on the limits of (self)-reflection, one does not (self)-reflect yet. To achieve (self)-
reflective ‘advancement’ one would need to abolish the conceptual foundations of
(self)-reflection in the first place and challenge its pedagogical objectives. Under the
current dominant pedagogy, however, we would not allow such results to happen.
We would not accept, for example, a stream of consciousness instead of an essay, a
charity action instead of a team project, a song instead of a structured presentation.
Such endeavours are only possible on creative degrees which permit the unpredict-
able and the unconventional as part of their pedagogical programme. In conse-
quence the question of how to teach and assess (self)-reflection becomes very
urgent, especially among international communities of students coming to study in
the UK, or students with learning difficulties, from different social groups, coming
from different paths in life who all undergo the same criteria of assessment and the
same mode of pedagogy (Dyke 2006). Those students who, by joining university,
submit to it uncritically without an opportunity to change its system, have not
reached a level of (self)-reflection. As Elaine Swan (2008, 393) argues, the effects
of self-reflection are unpredictable and can be dangerous even for that one who self-
reflects, let alone for the structure within which the process takes place. Is this why
critical self-reflection has become a regulated method of teaching and learning in
Higher Education?
Complicity and freedom
A methodological implementation of critical skills allows students and teachers to
reflect on the whole structure of academic performance, such as the content or
delivery of teaching and forms of assessment (Freire 1973; Cherryholmes 1988; Clift,
Houston, and Pugach 1990). Taking this methodological procedure even further,
academia encourages its participants to apply the effects of critical thinking to the
student’s own ‘self’, so that they can understand their own position in the world
(Schön 1983). This realisation, however, is not aimed at transcending the complete-
ness, or self-reliance, of academia. (Self)-reflection in its post-Kantian version is a
political task which takes place within the borders delineated by the decision-makers,
who situate the universal context of academia against the particular context of a
student or a teacher. That it becomes an ethical task is discussed less, if at all, in
academic circles, where ethics is just taught as a separate subject, but not as the
foundation of teaching per se (Peters 1971; Kennedy 1997).
Levinas regards ethics as preceding any social and, more importantly, ontological
order, while freedom is a state given to the subject, which does not need to be specif-
ically recognised in a conceptual manner as ‘freedom’. For Levinas, once freedom is
thematicised as freedom it stops being an absolute freedom and escapes ethics. At the
same time, what was later developed by Jacques Derrida and post-Marxists in a post-
structuralist discourse of contingency (Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau, Chantalle Mouffe),
was how the unlimitedness of choices and not giving a priority to any particular ethi-
cal discourse determines to a certain extent the horizon of infinity which reinforces
freedom and our never being sure what to choose. Joanna Zylinska elaborates on this
in relation to Ernesto Laclau’s argument on contingency: 
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Contingency already inheres an ethical injunction to choose, to make a decision. Even
though Laclau acknowledges the limitedness of every ‘context’ in which we find
ourselves, as if ‘carved’ from the horizon of infinity, he also recognizes that this limit-
edness gives us a reason to choose and help us make a decision … The acknowledgement
of this horizon of infinity, and of the fact that at no moment in time will we be able to
grasp all the available options, makes Laclau advise vigilance towards our own position
in the world. (Zylinska 2005, 18)
In education ‘the vigilance towards our own position in the world’ would respond to
the method of (self)-reflection which, from a Levinasian point of view, should serve
as a platform for questioning the conditions of selfhood. Yet what (self)-reflection
does in fact is utilise the freedom of interpretation to secure the post-Kantian subject
who never questions the rules of interpretation. Heideggerian ‘being-in-the-world’,
which refuses to define reality from an abstract perspective, could be an answer to
these limits of the subject who experiences life rather than investigates it. Yet the same
subject is also trapped in the ontological sameness of selfhood which lives immersed
in totality, consciously experienced through particularity.2 In this discovery of
Heidegger Levinas sees a return to Western philosophy: 
That which lives in the totality exists as totality, as if it occupied the centre of being and
were its source, as if it drew everything from the here and now, but in which it is in fact
placed or created. To it, the forces that traverse it are already assumed – it experiences
them as already integrated into its needs and enjoyment. What is perceived by the think-
ing being as exteriority inviting it to labor and assume ownership is experienced by the
living being as its substance, co-substantial with it, essentially immediate, an element
and an environment. (Levinas [1998] 2006, 11)
This model gives priority to conceptualisation by the abstract cogito and standing
outside of and prior to history and life. Hereupon, a ‘search after truth’ comes under
‘production of knowledge’ today formulated within the political boundaries of
employability and the economic dimension of customer satisfaction (Bauman 1988;
Bloom 1987; Veld, Fussel, and Neave 1996). In that sense the Quality Assurance
Agency (QAA) for England makes the recommendations for a successful degree very
clear: 
Generally, programmes prepare students well for future employment, especially where
curricular content is relevant to employment, industry and students’ career intentions. A
key strength of many programmes is the opportunity for students to combine study for a
higher education qualification with relevant employment, particularly through part-time
programmes, work-based projects or work placements. A small minority of colleges
have not made use of employers or external practitioners to develop or enhance their
curricula, resulting in less evidence of currency in curriculum content. (QAA 2008b)
Lying within the compass of liberalism and the free market, the differentiation of
disciplines, views, practices, ethics and forms of academic conduct do not surpass the
circle of essentialist methodology but rather neutralises frictions between antagonistic
forces (van der Marijk 1999; Jongbloed, Maasen, and Neave 1999; Mason 1998). It is
the universality of knowledge produced under the umbrella of quality standardisation,
validating consistency, quality as fitness for purpose, and quality as value for money
(Harvey and Knight 1996), which has been formally accepted as ‘the essential and
identifying feature of academia’ (Mori 2000, 14). Although many teachers try to
oppose this politics by applying their own methods and exploring alternative
pedagogy (Abercrombie 1970; Salzberger-Wittenberg and Osborne 1983; Lave and
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Wenger 1991; Gadamer 1992; Jarvis 1992; Benson and Blackman 2003; Polachek
2006), their efforts, quite often with tools of the New Media, such as bloggings, chat-
ting and networking (Rabikowska 2009)  have to be finally encompassed by the ideol-
ogy of academic standardisation and equality (Eraut 1994). Those features provide a
framework for a use-value status of higher education with (self)-criticism being a
pragmatic advantage. Non-traditional pedagogy drawing from postmodern theories,
such as dialogism (Bakhtin, Gadamer), hermeneutics (Dilthey, Ricoeur) deconstruc-
tion (Derrida, Szkudlarek), pragmatism (Rorty) or interpretivism (Giroux) need to
achieve more than encompassing pluralised identity. Yet in academia driven by the
modern, linear approach to history and culture, education is situated in the stream of
power where it is protected from contingency and unpredictability. It is embedded, for
example, in radical democratic projects seeking to empower those from disadvantaged
or socially dysfunctional groups. Inviting such groups to academia (often through
intensive advertising and promotion), alongside different races, classes, sexual and
religious orientations, with a whole new generation of youth brought up under post-
modern economic and cultural conditions, becomes a political act whose conse-
quences cannot be subordinated to the politics of universal good or an ethos of equal
rights. In fact, asking the other to (self)-reflect should be defined in terms of politics
and ethics in the first place.
Pedagogy of the loop
As has been said, this is a positivist order, originating from the natural sciences, which
posits a separation of subject and object in search of universally valid laws which
would smooth the functioning of the whole. 
Positivism is that school within philosophy of science which holds that the only means
by which claims to knowledge about the world can be sustained is through an appeal to
experience, observation, and testing. For the positivistic approach, a description of data
collected from the empirically recognised sources lies in listing them and relating them
to other value-free descriptions. Objectivity, method, and evidence have become the
tools of conceptualisation and explanation undertaken from the inside of the investigated
circle. (Cox and Sinclair 1999, 6)
The effects of such an approach are projected in the structures of educational curricula,
administration and management organisation, as well as government and business-
based research (Jackson 2000; Fuller 2000). Symptomatically, in the nomenclature
generated under this approach, a process of dealing effectively with particular elements
of the system is dubbed ‘closing the loop’. From its initial focus on the improvement
of the internal administration structure supporting the enhancement of teaching and
assessment, ‘the loop’ expanded to the outside web of relations between the forces of
academic oligarchy, state authority and market demand. The flow of information
between these poles is steered and monitored by the stakeholders themselves who
comply with the ‘standardisation’ of quality and performance ‘across the board’. The
operational techniques which enable an unobtrusive circulation lie in adaptation
processes annihilating any potential discreteness. The problem is a fixed point of refer-
ence we all accept. Despite the structural divergence within recognition measures,
teaching methods, research execution, resource allocation and exchange programmes
with other institutions or countries, the same abstract reason conceptualises the role of
academia from ‘within’ thus swallowing any ontological differences. On the outside
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there are practical differences in methods, programme specifications, and pedagogical
approaches, but they do not have the power to change the core of thinking about educa-
tion. As Deleuze and Guattari ([1972] 2000, 40) indicate, in a capitalistic market those
differences become epistemological simulations pertained in order to be imported as
‘the partial bricks within the coexistence and the interaction of all the synthesis’. The
effect is production and consumption of knowledge in compliance with internal and
external audits, employers’ panels, alumni liaisons, external examiners, and, of course,
students’ feedback. Confronting the reports from each side serves one purpose: to meet
the demand of the educational system (Readings 1996).
PBL and PDP: post-modern methods trapped in positivism
Today, educational systems provide the evidence of life-involving, active, student-
based, reflective methods of teaching and learning introduced in order to renounce the
old ‘rote’ system of education stemming from the abstract intellectualisation of science
(Ramsden 2003). These new activities, heralded in Great Britain in the 1990s, are
oriented towards risk-taking, self-motivation, curiosity, self-directness, and the relevant
use of resources (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 2008a). Signifi-
cantly, these grew alongside the advent of new market-based economies. Under these
objectives, it is particularly PBL which encourages active participation of a learner in
education mainly by linking the learner’s other experiences with the process of learning,
and with PDP which is to document the (self)-reflective approach to the learning process.
Being originally related to vocational courses, PLB has become very popular and
widely adapted across the humanities and sciences, and in some cases even on more
traditional degrees, like philosophy or literature (Abercrombie 1970; Birch 1986;
Colby 1986; Boud and Feletti 1997; Alavi 1995; Glasgow 1997; Wilkerson and
Gijselaers 1996). Glasgow (1997, xxvi) explains PBL as an approach which requires
students to ‘acquire knowledge, information, and learning techniques and processes
while working towards the solution of a problem, on an investigation, or toward
the production of a product’. Most importantly, the PBL strategy, in response to the
self-generating profusion of a market environment, aims to evoke reflection, self-
motivation, and self-evaluation in order to enable students to adjust their current posi-
tion to their future professional careers. By internalising life experiences, reassessing
the usefulness of learning, and assessing their own learning (Saskatchewen Education
1988), students are expected to become independent learners ready to grasp the cave-
ats of the changing society and the hyperactive market. The PBL approach perfectly
illustrates how knowledge and experience overlap within the expectations and require-
ments of stakeholders: employers–students–teachers–society–authorities. The seven
steps of PBL encourage a search for a solution with the following phases: (1) present-
ing a problem, (2) free discussion and analysis, (3) identifying relevant resources, (4)
formulating objectives and applying research, (5) regrouping results and feeding back
knowledge, (6) applying solutions in practice, and (7) mapping out a process of anal-
ysis within the area of empirical communication (Boud and Feletti 1997). It can be
concluded that the problem-solving process, from ascertaining the problem in relation
to students’ experience through using resources in the available social and academic
environment and applying the solution to their context (whether in real life or an
academic assessment) enacts the design of a curriculum delineating the ground for
action. Such an activity is enclosed in the same pattern of experience as that rooted in
the market-led epistemology methods of teaching and learning endorsed by the
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Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (2008b). By including knowledge
of society from employers, which is often necessary for the validation of programmes,
universities adopt the market’s status and ‘sell’ it back to society when students grad-
uate. Acting in the loop, they all fertilise the socio-political and cultural background
which influences the student’s experience applied to the teaching and learning
process, such as the PBL. In this transfer of knowledge and experience both teachers
and students become passive performers of educational policies mushrooming under
the umbrella of active learning, self-motivated learning, student-based learning and
project-based learning which are embedded in degree programmes across all disci-
plines today. (Self)-reflection in this process lies in the interpretation by the subject of
the overarching context from his/her subjective perspective, but without considering
the aims and the mode of the process of interpretation itself.
As in the positivist model of reasoning, problem-solving guarantees the most
effective solution justified by the given data objectively assessed within one
paradigm. Insofar as it predicates the authority of the abstract reasoning in the datum-
based purposive activity of tangible agents (e.g. in scientific laboratories, in accord
with natural sciences), problem-solving theory justifies the reliability and complicity
of general and political laws.
A tool to measure a degree of reflection upon students’ performance has been
introduced in distinctive forms by different departments which have to maintain a
database of students’ critical approach/skills. This can be part of a process of summa-
tive or formative assessment, or it can take the shape of a single assessment, such as
a critical journal, critical essay, or reflective presentation. Additionally, in the last
eight years, the measurement of critical skills has been formalised and standardised by
the implementation of Personal Development Planning (PDP) in which students
monitor and assess their own progress. According to the Dearing Report, PDP is ‘a
structured and supported process undertaken by an individual to reflect upon their own
learning, performance and/or achievement and to plan for their personal, educational
and career development’ (QAA 2008a, emphasis added). The White Paper of 2002,
The Future of Higher Education, already reinforced the issue of implementing PDP in
2003, hoping for its full realisation in 2005 by all universities in the UK. What PDP
requires is for ‘learners to understand and reflect on their achievements, and to present
those achievements to employers, institutions, and other stakeholders’ (QAA 2008a).
Again, as in the case of PBL, the application of the self-reflexive approach, which
underpins all educational strategies today, subscribes for the inner application of the
effects of reflection acutely unaware of the limits of its context (students, employers,
institutions, and other stakeholders).
As the above examples indicate, the reformed educational theory adjusted to the
conditions of modern society incorporate ‘life’ and ‘reflection’ into the boundaries of
the same ontological equilibrium which guarantees the smooth osmosis of data.
Importantly, such an undisturbed circulation undergoes an ethical devaluation since it
contributes to the normalisation of the totalising processes, in this case, transparency
processes, documented in monitoring and moderating strategies ensured prior to the
action undertaken by the actors. Consequently, the teaching–learning process falls into
the manner of transmuting life experiences into a defunct collection of ‘value-free’
data. The transient state of time, place and culture becomes generally formulated and
devoid of a possible rupture.
Although curricula enable individual decisions of both institutions and tutors as to
methods of implementation, it is not possible to reject the nationally recommended
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apparatus of educational theory employed by the institutions. There is, of course, an
inner resistance and differentiation among performers of the national legislation, but
it is not the actual versatility in tutors’ performances which matters in a process of
knowledge transmission. Naturally, delivery as such undergoes strict mechanisms of
assessment (external and internal audits, peer reviews, students’ evaluation), and is
controlled according to its direct correspondence with the programme and school’s
official guidelines. A pedagogical strategy recommended for Higher Education
predicts meeting the objectives at the end of each module according to the aims
outlined at the beginning. Completing the curriculum requires teaching and learning
to fit within the very strict framework of the module specifications. In this preoccupa-
tion with outcomes, certain knowledge is produced and later reapplied in the context
of the balance between what is ‘put in’ and ‘taken out’, preventing deviation from the
content in the process of reflection. From a historical point of view, the whole method
‘takes the production process and the power relations inherent in it as a given element
of the national interest, and therefore as part of its parameters’ (Cox and Sinclair 1999,
96). By comparing the problem-solving theory investigated by Cox to PBL adapted
by academia, it can be concluded that educational politics and positivist ontology
merge on the grounds that events are conceived as an infinite series of objectified data.
By ‘putting them together on the table’, as the PBL jargon puts it, the method does not
leave space for a break in the system. Besides, such a result would not be apposite in
the face of the method which the QAA employs for the system’s sake. The apparent
action inspired by life experience is reassured by the limits of the system in which the
actual problem-solving action takes place. As Cox and Sinclair (1999, 5) put it, ‘it is
the action, not the limits of the system, that is the analytical focus of problem solving’.
By scooping out particular problems and interpreting them in relation to the special-
ised areas of activity, PBL ‘takes the world as it finds it’ (Cox and Sinclair 1999, 88)
and thus consequently reinforces a totalising approach in pedagogy.
The assumptions behind PBL reveal that ‘life’ works as empirical evidence for the
relativity of knowledge which is channelled in the academic environment and reap-
plied in the working environment. An echo of the vitalist philosophy (Berlin 1976)
that invites life as a condition to understand being, permeates this proposition. As was
said before, ‘being-immersed-in-being’ does not guarantee knowing its limits. Like-
wise, a problem thrown into a classroom never breaks through the classroom’s walls.
PBL, alongside the positivist paradigm, protects the legislation of systematic educa-
tion and guarantees a limited range of solutions. Although pedagogical underpinnings
of the method are very positive on their own (they link the student with the external
world and prepare the ground for change), they do not absorb the practical response
from the student into the curriculum. The solution of the problem, even if achieved by
means of new and unexpected research, does not affect the episteme of the whole,
leaving the pillars of the educational system, such as the marking system, or disciplin-
ary divisions, unaffected. At present, applying PBL, accompanied by self-reflective
reporting in PDP reinforces the analytical approach to solving the practical crisis. As
Bauman (1993, 21) argues in the wider context of the ‘ideology of intellectuals’, a
legislatively oriented discourse of intellectualism contains in the imperative: ‘a diffi-
culty to be resolved theoretically and removed practically’. Bauman’s emphasis on the
simultaneity of the two directions designates the illusory condition of the ‘problem’
neutralised in the space of the method. In the enmeshment of thoughts and behaviours
produced by the same ontological order, the act of conjunction of data turns into the
act of commutation, subsequently preventing the possibility of reflecting on these
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mechanisms from the outside order (that Levinas calls the pre-order) on which any
emerging order is put into question. It has been argued in this paper that such a
direction would have an ethical meaning, if it was practically realised by the students
as part of their (self)-reflection.
Conclusions
Without a metatextual, or simply, a reflective overview of how totality comes to exist-
ence, it is not possible to understand how it works and how it comes apart. A contem-
porary approach to (self)-reflection addresses the metalanguage of objectivity, as
such, and reinforces a position of historicist determinism which emphasises the equal
participation of the historian in making history and the history that has made the
historian (Carr [1961] 2001). Such an approach, although engaged in ‘life’, still seeks
for universal laws and universal morality in a procession of events, while the meta-
perspectives of Levinas and Cox ask for the individual awareness of the historical
setting only to be recognised when disturbed by the effect of the confrontation of the
aware subject with the object that awakes that awareness. In critical pedagogy, this
would require a method of ethical (self)-reflection which entails asking about the point
of reflection and, at the same time, asking about the position of those who ask.
In the light of the above argument, the responsibility of academia for the world’s
historical or ontological order is limited to the amount of freedom designated to it by
that order. In this respect, the challenging criticism of teachers’ ethical subservience
from the author of the methodological guide on PBL, Neil Glasgow, seems to be
insufficient. Glasgow (1997, xviii) admits that: ‘We, as teachers, rely on others in
education to define what experiences students should have and not to trust ourselves
to look into the real world and identify what skill and knowledge are really required’.
From my standpoint, that courage and independence, which Glasgow refuses to teach-
ers, has been deified by the modern paradigm upon which teachers draw for their
profession. Looking into the real world to see what it needs does not imply changing
that world to make it need what we believe it should have. The same lack of value is
criticised by Levinas when he questions the authenticity of Being asserted from the
inside of the human mind, as well as by Cox in his critique of the uncritical positivist
method of research. An ethics of teaching which focuses on how to reproduce a domi-
neering system is bestowed on academia by a negative ideology. An ethics of looking
into the real world and asking the question ‘what skills and knowledge are really
required’ is motivated by a critical, and in that sense positive, ideology. Such an ideol-
ogy is stipulated by an individual responsibility for the Other (Levinas 1991) and
consequently for the ‘real world’. As a result, (self)-reflection, applied to the teaching
and learning process, would encourage an understanding of one’s position in the
whole, taking the whole as the object of criticism. However, to make further progress,
it is important to bear in mind Bauman’s statement that looking into the real world
demands questioning the border of the world from which a reflective question is
asked. Freed from the paradigm, the subject can see the world as other than himself,
but not as a negation of himself, since their existence is dependent on each other.
Notes
1. Levinas’s (1949) argument differs from traditional metaphysics mainly on the ethical
ground that precedes any ontological concept of being: ethics here lies in an approach to
being that starts in a meeting with the other. This approach requires abandoning of the
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concept of the subject as posited against the object, or a particular being as recognised
against a universal Being. Primarily Levinas draws upon Heidegger who introduced a new
ontology by pointing at the relational connection between being and Being which laid foun-
dation to the Levinasian later critique. Levinas, however, put his teacher’s philosophy
under scrutiny and criticised it for separating ontology from the eternal and for omitting the
role of the other in our understanding of being. For Levinas, the Heideggerian project of
the selfhood derives from a totalising dimension of the Same where being and Being (the
equivalent of the existent and existence) are contained in each other and where ontological
relationship emerges within the boundaries of an exclusive Selfhood. The immersion of
being in Being before death has a different direction in Levinas: human existence (being)
derives from a temporal relationship with existence (Being) as a prior condition of which
we do not know anything until our realisation of the presence of the other. Levinas (2006,
5) writes: ‘The other is a being and counts as such’ whereas ‘for Heidegger, to relate to
beings qua beings means to let beings be, to understand them as independent of the percep-
tion that discovers and grasps them’ (Levinas 2006, 5). What is crucial in the debate on
pedagogy is this point of departure between the two philosophers which involves their
different understanding of the relationship between the particular and the universal.
Levinas (2006, 4) cannot accept that ‘to understand is to relate to the particular, which
alone exists, through knowledge, which is always knowledge of the universal’. Levinas
does not appreciate metaphysical insight in reflection that returns to itself via a personal
narrative about the relationship with the world. Reflection in Levinas (2006, 4) cannot be
complacent with reflection on itself or existence, but instead on the other who conceives of
the exteriority and enables thought. The very core of metaphysical reflection lies in that
moment when ‘thought becomes conscious of itself and at the same time conscious of the
exteriority that goes beyond its nature, that encloses it’. See a detailed analysis of Levinas’s
argument against Heidegger in Chanter (1987) and a discussion by Derrida (1984). On the
history of traditional metaphysics which supports subject–object oppositional relationship,
see (Bader 1979; 1983; Habermas 1987). For a history of counter concepts in metaphysics
including Levinas’s ontological theory of anti-essentialism, see Coreth (1989).
2. The mythical meaning of the wholeness of society, Laclau (1990) argues in New Reflection
on the Revolution of Our Time, where he admits that the impossibility of that fullness makes
a desire to achieve it deeply ethical. In that sense, the interrelations between objects do not
take place in time and place but they, in fact, create time and space. Where Laclau meets
with Levinas and Cox is the conviction of the author of New Reflections that decisions are
made on the ground of the a priori principle external to the decision itself. He writes: ‘[T]he
Cartesian illusion of an absolute starting point must also be given up, since the person
making ethical judgments is never an abstract individual, but a member of a certain commu-
nity that already believes in a number of principles and values’ (Laclau 1990, 243). Partic-
ular decisions, for Laclau, can be only made against the horizon of infinity which transcends
the singular. Interestingly, for Laclau it is also the conceptualisation of time and space that
has to be revisited if a social and historical making of society is to become a responsible/
ethical process. Although clearly Newtonian in its principle, Laclau’s strict divide between
time and space brings about a new explanation of the social relations which take place
within them. According to Laclau (1990, 84), spatiality on it own is impossible, ‘any effort
to spatialise time, ultimately fails and space becomes an event’.
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